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ABSTRACT 
Memory acquisition is essential to defeat anti-forensic operating-system features and investigate 
cyberattacks that leave little or no evidence in secondary storage. The forensic community has 
developed tools to acquire physical memory from Apple's Macintosh computers, but they have not 
much been tested. This work tested three major OS X memory-acquisition tools. Although the 
tools could capture system memory accurately, the open-source tool OSXPmem appeared 
advantageous in size, reliability, and support for memory configurations and versions of the OS X 
operating system. 
Keywords: digital forensics; acquisition; main memory; Macintosh; OSX; testing 
l. INTRODUCTION 
As Recent Macintosh OS X operating systems 
incorporate many anti-forensic features, most 
notably in cloud storage and encryption. Users 
can fully encrypt many things, including entire 
volumes of the secondary storage, making it 
impossible to recover forensic evidence from 
storage in a reasonable period of time without 
passwords. Because of this, forensics on the 
main memory of such systems is increasingly 
valuable. Memory forensics can recover 
running processes, network packets, 
communications artifacts, encryption keys, and 
injected code from volatile memory. It is 
helpful to compare available tools for memory 
forensics. 
2. PREVIOUS WORK 
Memory acquisition is a challenge for digital 
forensics because memory is volatile, and a tool 
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must interact gracefully with an operating 
system, as noted in Sutherland et al. (2008). 
Errors can occur with any memory acquisition 
because memory changes unpredictably over 
time, as discussed in Pan et al. (2008), but 
tools can do several things to minimize errors. 
While there are a number of memory-
acquisition tools and analysis programs for 
Windows operating systems (see Neethu et al., 
2014) and Android devices (see Li et al. , 2016) , 
there are only a few for Macintosh systems ( see 
Ligh et al., 2014). Macintosh machines 
generally impose stiffer access controls than 
Windows machines, but they are more 
aggressive in caching, which permits recovering 
some main memory even when the machine 
has been turned off, as noted by BlackBag 
Technologies (2017). 
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Most research on memory acquisition has 
focused on developing new techniques, with 
only a few projects testing tools. Carvajal et al. 
(2013) compared six Windows tools in their 
ability to extract memory quickly without 
leaving artifacts. Kamal et al. (2016) also 
tested six Windows tools ( two different from 
the previous work) and focused on the artifacts 
left by the tools. Ahmed and Aslam (2015) 
compared six Windows tools ( four different 
from Carvajal et al) and found a few 
differences in performance between them, 
especially when anti-forensics measures were 
taken on the target machines. 
The abovementioned tools provide 
software-based acquisition, in contrast to tools 
such as Inception and Passware's Firewire 
Memory Imager that are hardware-supported. 
Hardware support can circumvent password 
protection, but there must be different tool 
versions for different hardware and they can be 
limited in how much memory they can acquire. 
Modern software-based tools generally require 
a kernel to be installed on the target system, 
must deal with memory compression, and must 
be careful to avoid interfering with reserved 
areas of memory as discussed in Libser and 
Kornblum (2008) . Memory-acquisition tools 
can be distinguished from memory-analysis 
tools such as the open-source Volatility (2015) 
and Rekall (2015) that allow inspection of 
specific artifacts, and analysis tools require 
detailed knowledge of where an operating 
system keeps things, so they require frequent 
updates. 
For Macintosh machines, software-based 
acquisition tools available are MacQuisition 
(www.blackbagtech.com/ software-
products / macquisi tion. html), Google / Rekall 
OSXPMem (releases. rekall-forensic. com), 
Sumuri Forensics RECON 
(sumueri.com/ software/ recon), Mandiant Mac 
Memoryze (www.fireeye.com/ 
services/ freeware / memoryze. html) , and 
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Volafox ( code.google.com/ p/ volafox). 
Volatility and VMWARE Fusion 
(www.vmware.com/ products/ fusion.html) after 
version 10. 7 also provide some Macintosh 
memory-forensic capabilities. 
3. lVlETHODOLOGY 
This work tested the three Macintosh memory-
acquisition tools: MacQuisition version 2014Rl , 
OSXPMem version RC3, and Sumuri Forensics 
RECON version 1.0.11. We evaluated the tools 
on (1) ability to write a physical-memory 
capture without crashing the target computer 
system, (2) obtrusiveness (what its memory 
footprint was and how long it took to run) , 
and (3) ability to produce a capture from 
which standard forensic artifacts could be 
recovered using the Volatility Framework and 
the Rekall Memory Forensic Framework. The 
Rekall plugins used were arp ( ARP tables) , 
ifconfig ( network interface), lsof ( open files), 
mount (mount points), netstat (network 
connections) , psaux (processes), and route 
( routing tables). The Volatility plugins used 
were mac_ arp, mac_ bash (Bash shell history) , 
mac-ifconfig, mac lsof, mac-mount , 
mac netstat, mac_ psaux, and mac route. We 
were particularly interested in comparing 
memory snapshots of tools in similar states 
since they could indicate functional differences 
or coverage gaps. 
This work first tested the OSX Mavericks 
(10.9.5) operating system, and then retested 
after upgrading to Yosemite 10.10.1 and 
10.10.2 (more details are given in Leopard, 
2015). Each tool was directed to write a 
memory capture to an external USB 3 hard 
drive of 7200RPM. In total, 450 captures were 
performed: 50 machines, 3 operating systems, 
and 3 forensic tools. 
We did five kinds of experiments: (1) 
testing the tools' ability to recover memory, 
(2) testing the localizing of encryption keys, 
(3) observing memory changes over time, ( 4) 
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comparing outputs between tools, and (5) 
comparing with output for a non-virtual 
environment. In all these experiments, we ran 
the operating systems with no additional 
modifications, software, or tasks. 
The rate at which memory changes affects 
the memory dumps acquired by tools. To 
analyze the systems more accurately, as well 
obtain flexibility in the setup, we created a 
virtual machine as in Zhang et al. (2010). We 
used VMware Fusion Professional version 7 .1.1 
and took a series of snapshots. The virtual 
machine ran the Mavericks operating system 
and was configured to use two processor cores 
and 8 GiB of memory. The host machine was a 
MacBook Pro (Retina, 15-inch, 2014) with a 
2.8 GHz Intel i7 processor and 16 GiB of 1600 
MHz DDR3 memory. Our specific procedure 
was: (1) log into the virtual machine and take 
a snapshot every minute for the first fifteen 
minutes, and then at 20, 25 , and 30 minutes; 
(2) use the Volatility plugin to decompress the 
snapshots; (3) create MD5 hashes for every 4 
KiB block; and ( 4) compare the MD5 hashes 
with the original hashes and note differences. 
We compared memory captured by each of our 
tools against the virtual machine snapshot that 
completed at a time closest to when each 
capture completed. We then compared the 
memory captures taken with the tools. 
Memory acquisition can be assessed in 
terms in its correctness (whether it captures 
what is stored in memory at some time), its 
atomicity ( whether it shows concurrent 
activity), and its integrity (its persistence in 
correctness for some guaranteed time period), 
as suggested in Vomel and Freiling (2012). The 
current work addressed correctness and (in a 
simple way) integrity, but not atomicity since 
analyzing that requires more precise tools. 
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4.RESULTS 
4 .1 Ability to Recover Merr1.ocy 
All three tools successfully acquired memory. 
Acquisition speeds were within 7% for the 
three. Physical memory sizes were 67.45 MiB 
for MacQuisition, 0.944 MiB for OSXPmem, 
and 206.7 MiB for RECON. Shared memory 
and private memory sizes were proportional. 
OSXPmem had a size advantage as a 
command-line tool without a graphical user 
interface. 
We observed several crashes caused by 
tools. Valuable forensic data can be 
permanently lost in a crash, so crash danger is 
important. No machine crashed more than 
once, and after a crash, a second acquisition 
attempt was often successful after the 
machines restarted, with one exception. The 
exception was when RECON was used to 
acquire memory from the Mac Pros with 64 
GiB of RAM; all the machines crashed, and 
additional attempts also failed. Nonetheless, 
examination of the results confirmed that if a 
memory capture was completed without a 
crash, the capture contained all forensic 
artifacts found by the other tools. 
4. 2 I..ocalizing Encryption Keys 
The Passware Password Recovery Kit Forensic 
Version 13.1 was used to confirm that 
encryption keys for File Vault2 were located 
within the OS X memory captures and could 
be used to decrypt the volume. To do this, 
File Vault2 was enabled on a MacBook Pro and 
a Mac Pro computer running Mavericks as well 
as on a MacBook Pro and a Mac Pro computer 
running Yosemite. Memory captures were done 
with MacQuisition, OSXPMem, and RECON 
on both the MacBook Pro and Mac Pro 
computers running Mavericks. RECON failed 
to capture physical memory from the Mac Pro 
computers. OSXPMem was used to capture 
memory from the Mac Pro and MacBook Pro 
Page 33
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running Yosemite. MacQuisition did not 
support Yosemite at the time. 
Passware located the encryption keys in all 
of the memory captures and successfully 
decrypted the File Vault2 volumes. The OS X 
user 's login password was located within all 
the memory captures using the hex editor 
iBored by searching for the term "longname" 
which we found frequently near a user's 
password. The password remained in the same 
block of memory during the thirty-minute 
period on all captures. 
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4 .3 Observing Memory Changes 
overThne 
Memory captures (snapshots) were taken over 
a period on a virtual machine with Mac OS 
version Mavericks installed. A Python script 
counted the 4 KiB blocks whose hash values 
changed from the original snapshot. Typically, 
the virtual machine used 1.35 GiB of memory 
ran 110-120 processes during tests. Results 
showed that on average only 5.33% of the 
blocks had changed after 30 minutes when 
running only default processes, and not 
smoothly (Figure 1). 
·'!" ' !' ,,. 
20 ~ I 
Figure 1. Average block hash match percentage over time on OSX Mavericks. 
Memory captures were larger than the 
allocated physical memory due to the presence 
of reserved areas. The datasheet for Fourth 
Generation Intel Core Processor Address Map 
describes reserved areas below 4GiB that do 
not belong to the dynamic random-access 
memory (see Intel, 2012). Because of this, 
when the vmem files containing the memory in 
the virtual-machine snapshots were converted 
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to raw images, each vmem file was 9 GiB in 
size, though the virtual-machine configuration 
allocated 8 GiB to physical memory. Stuttgen 
and Cohen (2015) discuss how physical 
memory addresses are used for communication 
with devices (video cards, PCI cards, and flash 
memory) on the motherboard with memory-
mapped I/ O. The 1 GiB block ranges observed 
between 3 GiB and 4 GiB appear to be 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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reserved for this, and the chipset routes 
memory access around these reserved regions. 
4.4 Comparing Tools 
All three tools captured the same range of null 
values in the first half of the memory graphs. 
The MacQuisition device log did report "bad 
addresses" were padded with zeroes beginning 
at block 786432 and ending at block 1048575. 
Each block contained 4096 bytes resulting in 
approximately 1 GiB of null characters. We 
inspected the block range in all three tool 
memory captures with a hex editor and 
confirmed that all the tools padded the same 
block range with zeroes. 
Figure 2 shows example 4-KiB block 
matches between the tool-acquired memory 
captures of the virtual machine and the 
virtual-machine snapshot SVl taken 1 minute 
after start. Figure 3 shows matches among the 
tool images themselves at the same times. The 
vertical axis represents slices of 4MiB, so each 
diagram shows around 9GiB of memory. The 
three plots in both Figures show MacQuisition, 
OSXPmem, and RECON in order. The darker 
areas represent matches to the initial memory 
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state without null (zero) characters; grey 
blocks represent blocks that match but contain 
null characters; and the white blocks represent 
blocks that have changed and do not match. 
The top of the diagram represents the 
beginning of memory. The waviness of the 
boundaries is intended to make them easier to 
see and does not indicate uncertainty. 
Overall, we saw similar regions of non-null 
matches ( the white areas) in all comparisons. 
However, the tool memory captures showed 
that most of the null characters observed in 
the virtual-machine snapshots were overwritten 
with data when the acquisition tools 
themselves acquired the memory. This would 
suggest as the memory-capture tools run, 
blocks of memory containing null characters 
get changed while other blocks remain mostly 
unchanged. Since these regions are large and 
outside the memory space used by the tools, it 
is unlikely that the tools themselves are 
changing the data directly. Rather, we 
conclude that some other mechanism of the 
operating system is writing to unused space in 
memory during the acquisition process. 
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Figure 2. Virtual Machine Comparisons of MacQuisition 
(Upper Left) , OSXPmem (Upper Right) , and RECON (Lower 
Left) to the Snapshot after 1 Minute on Each Machine 
(Vertical Axis Measures 4MiB Slices) 
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Figure 3. Comparison of the Three Tools on Analogous States 
of a Virtual Machine 
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Figure 3 also shows that each tool is 
capturing the same matched blocks and the 
same reserved region as the virtual-machine 
snapshot . But the tools differ in how they 
capture blocks of memory that do not match 
the blocks from snapshot. This suggests not 
only that the tools are introducing change to 
the memory space during the acquisition 
process, but also that each is changing the 
space in a unique way, so the changes from 
different tools do not match each other. 
Nonetheless, we saw no evidence of 
@ 2018 ADFSL P age 37
  
JDFSL V13Nl Testing Memory Forensics Tools for the Macintosh ... 
randomizing of memory locations on reboots, 
as described in Gu and Lin (2016), at this level 
of granularity. 
4 . 5 Comparing to a Non-Virtual 
Environment 
To control for possible effects due solely to 
VMware's environment, we tested the tools in 
a non-virtual environment of a physical Mac 
Mini (late 2014) with a 2.6 GHz Intel i7 
processor, 8 GiB of 1600 MHz DDR3 memory, 
and running Mavericks. Each tool acquired a 
9.74 GiB raw file (Figure 4). There were 
nonmatching blocks in the first 2GiB of the 
memory that had not been observed before, 
but they were not clustered, causing the gray 
shading. All tools captured the same range of 
null values 2GiB to 4GiB with some small 
differences in the claimed boundaries, and 
overall this reserved area appeared to be larger 
than in the virtual-machine memory images. 
Analysis with a hex editor determined that the 
reserved region began at 2.17 GiB and 
continued until 4 GiB. It is clear there are 
more changes to memory on a real machine. 
Data also showed that the block matches 
containing non-null characters were initially 
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around 30% of the total captured material, but 
remained relatively stable, declining by less 
than 10% over a 30-minute period (Figure 5). 
The match percent was less than what was 
observed in the virtual environment as Figure 
3 also suggests. 
5. CONCLUSION 
MacQuisition, RECON, and OSXPmem were 
all successful in capturing memory from OSX 
on Macintosh computers. However, OSXPmem 
bettered its proprietary counterparts in its size, 
reliability, and support for memory 
configurations and versions of the OSX 
operating system. Volatility and Rekall could 
use the memory captures from all three tools 
to obtain artifacts such as File Vault2 
encryption keys. Nonetheless, we observed 
crashes. Ligh et al. (2015) acknowledges that 
all memory-acquisition tools can cause system 
crashes since the tool may access a reserved 
region at the wrong time or interfere with a 
system-critical function. Interference may be 
hard to anticipate because of variations 
between OSX versions and installed hardware. 
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Figure 5. Match Percentage Comparison over Time (Top is RECON, 
Middle is MacQuisition, Bottom is OSXPmem) 
Our results showed that size of the memory 
capture was constant over the tools. Memory 
dumps were larger than the amount of physical 
memory (17.99 GiB versus 16 GiB for 
MacBook Pro was typical) due to reserved 
regions. 
Comparison of the virtual-machine 
snapshots taken over thirty minutes showed 
that with running only the default processes, 
memory did not change much. Though 
significant regions of memory did not match 
between the tool-acquired dumps and the 
virtual-machine snapshots, these regions 
contained nulls in the baseline snapshot. 
Because of this, our analysis of forensic 
artifacts using Volatility and Rekall failed to 
detect any situations in which the non-
matching regions corresponded to a loss of 
forensic evidence. 
The experiments with a non-virtual 
environment showed the memory captures 
from all three tools appeared similar in the 
blocks that matched but did not match as well 
for the blocks containing null characters. The 
results also agree with the results of our tests 
in the virtual environment in that the regions 
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of memory that match between comparisons 
did not change much over time. 
Future work will examine in more detail 
the exact changes in files over time and the 
discrepancies between different tools. 
Discrepancies suggest, without having to 
analyze the operating system, where volatile 
memory stores key operating-system 
parameters and links. Future work will also 
investigate the effects of simultaneously 
running additional software on the operating-
system memory images. 
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